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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the takeover battle for Paramount Communications between Viacom 
and QVC. It gives a detailed analysis of Viacom‘s acquisition of Paramount 
Communication, its strategic and financial reasons as well as impacts. Today, Viacom is 
one of the world’s leading media conglomerate, when comparing its revenues1 for 2010 
($9, 34 billion), revenue growth2 (1%) and Return on Equity3 (18, 2%) with peers.  
On the 3rd of February 2011 during the Financial Announcement for the year 2010, the 
President and CEO of the company, Philippe Dauman said: 
 
“We're off to a great start in fiscal 2011. The creative momentum in our 
major networks is building as we judiciously invest in original 
programming. This puts Viacom in the pole position in the race to capitalize 
on new opportunities for monetizing television content through emerging 
media here and around the world. We're excited about the potential for 
expanding our international businesses, and we know that our film studio is 
poised for a great year.”4 
 
In my opinion Viacom overpaid for Paramount by more than $2 billion. Viacom was 
willing to overpay more than QVC was willing to and that is why the company won the 
takeover battle. Even though Sumner Redstone, the CEO of Viacom, owned more than 
75% of Viacom’s cash flows of voting rights, the price of hubris exceeded $1.5 billion.  
Even though, the company overpaid by more than $2 billion, under the command of 
Redstone, Viacom had the best performance ever. The company produced during these 10 
years such films as: “Saving Private Ryan”, “Titanic”, “Brave heart” and “Forrest Gump”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 www.viacom.com 
2
 www.viacom.com 
3
 http://finapps.forbes.com/ 
4
 http://seekingalpha.com/ 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a simple principle in everything we do: grow or die. This rule is very adequate in 
the business field as well. Those companies which grow can take the market share from 
their competitors, increase profits and provide return to the shareholders. On the other 
hand, those companies, which stay at the same level and do not grow, lose market shares, 
customers and they destroy the shareholder value. Mergers and acquisitions play an 
important role in both cases: they enable strong and big companies to grow faster than the 
competitors and they provide enterprisers rewards. M&As ensure as well the weaker 
companies that they are irrelevant, worse and more quickly swallowed5.  
 
“Mergers and acquisitions are vital part of any healthy economy and 
importantly, the primary way that companies are able to provide returns to 
owners and investors. This fact, combined with the potential for large 
returns, makes acquisition a highly attractive way for entrepreneurs and 
owners to capitalize on a value created in a company”6.  
 
First of all the phrase mergers and acquisitions should be explained. As well a merger as an 
acquisition is a transaction. The first one combines two companies, leaving one surviving 
entity. The second one is the purchase by another company or individual. Both “deals” 
could fall under general heading of takeovers.7 
It refers to the aspect of corporate finance, strategy and management dealing with the 
selling, buying and combining of companies, which can help, finance, or aid a growing 
company in a given industry grows faster without having to create another business entity. 
That is why it would be interesting to provide which impact one acquisition has on the 
whole industry.  
In the beginning I would like to write about the entertainment industry. Later on I will give 
an overview of the three companies that were involved in the takeover battle: Paramount 
Communications Inc., Viacom International and QVC Network Inc.  
                                                 
5
 Sherma, Hart  (2006) 1 
6
 Sherma, Hart  (2006) 1 
7
 Hirshleifer (1994) 
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Then, I will illustrate the need for a change. I will show Paramount Communication’s 
financial performance as well as the financial performance of its main competitors (Time 
Warner, News Corporation, CBS and Walt Disney) and I will compare all companies. I 
will try to illustrate the bidding tactics of Viacom and QVC and the Paramount responses. 
Also, I will try to show the behavior of managers, boards of directors, and courts in the 
middle of a takeover battle. After that, I will evaluate if this takeover was the best solution 
for Paramount Communications. I will consider the alternatives that Paramount 
Communications had and I will try to evaluate these alternatives critically. I will propose 
some alternatives, which Paramount Communications could have chosen if it had not 
merged with Viacom.  
Writing this paper is going to be very interesting and educational. Acquisitions themselves 
are intriguing. It is a way of cooperation between potential competitors, suppliers, 
producers or customers, who have decided to run a business together. This operation 
concentrates on the development and growth in a given market. We all know that after an 
acquisition and merger synergy occurs, this refers to a mutual financial or management 
benefit. The final outcome of the bidding war will show if the synergy occurred and I will 
try to show the amount by which each bidder was willing to over- or underpay.  
 
2. Entertainment Industry  
 
All three companies, that were involved in the takeover battle operated in the entertainment 
industry. Today entertainment industry is also known as show business and consists of a 
large number of sub-industries. Those sub-industries are: vaudeville, musical theatre, film, 
television and music. However, the main areas of this industry are: film and television and 
I am going to concentrate on this.  
Television shows are produced for the cable and broadcast television networks. These 
television networks pay producers for the programming. The cable television network sells 
programming to the local cable television operators. In the late 80s and early 90s TCI and 
Time Warner were the leading local cable operators. Turning to the broadcast network, it 
sends programs to the related stations which broadcast the programming locally without 
charging. Television stations and networks earn money by charging for the commercials 
during the broadcast programs.  
Second major area of the entertainment industry is film. Films are produced by the 
production companies. The largest film producers in the late 80s and early 90s were: 
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Columbia/TriStar, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal, Paramount, Warner Brothers and 
Walt Disney. Those companies were known not only for producing their own films but 
also for financing and distributing those films to the audiences. There were several steps in 
the distribution of the movies. Firstly, the distributor arranged with the cinema owners to 
exhibit the movie in the cinema. Cinema revenues accounted for almost 30% of the movie 
industry revenues8. Second step was recording the movies on the videocassettes and 
distributing them. This step was undertaken usually a couple of months after the movie had 
been shown in the theatre. This market accounted almost 40% of the movie industry 
revenues. Third step was broadcasting the movie on pay cable television and after that 
broadcasting it on network television. The last step was licensing the film to the local 
television syndicators.   
The following table illustrates the annual film industry statistics for the period 1980-1993. 
Table 1: Annual film industry statistics 
Year 
 
Total U.S. 
Box 
Office 
Revenues  
(millions) 
Total U.S. 
Admissions  
(millions) 
Motion 
Pictures 
Association 
of America 
Releases 
Domestic 
Screens 
(thousands) 
Major 
Distributors 
Filmed 
Entertain. 
Revenues  
(millions)  
Major 
Distributors 
Filmed 
Entertain 
Operating 
Income  
(millions) 
Average 
Total 
Releasing 
Cost Per 
Film  
(millions) 
1993 5154 1244 161 25.7 17417 1004 44.0 
1992 4871 1173 150 25.1 15938 1288 42.3 
1991 4803 1141 164 24.5 14208 948 38.2 
1990 5022 1189 169 23.7 12676 1103 38.8 
1989 5033 1263 169 23.1 11571 1130 32.7 
1988 4458 1085 160 23.2 9121 1151 26.6 
1987 4260 1089 129 23.6 8251 928 28.3 
1986 3778 1017 139 22.8 6839 799 24.1 
1985 3749 1056 153 21.1 6359 465 23.2 
1984 4031 1199 167 20.2 5839 516 21.1 
1983 3766 1197 190 18.9 5324 590 17.1 
                                                 
8
 Vogel (1994) 
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1982 3453 1175 173 18.0 4548 565 16.8 
1981 2966 1060 173 18.0 3749 301 15.7 
1980 2749 1022 161 17.6 3997 489 13.7 
Source: Paramount Communications Inc. – 1993, Steven N. Kaplan, University of Chicago 
 
At that time (1980-2000) film costs had been increasing substantially but the number of the 
feature movies released had not changed. However, the risk on each movie had been 
reduced because of payoffs from sales and rentals of home videos. The other reason, why 
the risk had been reduced, is that there was a bigger demand for programming from the 
cable networks9.  
In terms of total revenues the industry had performed a significant increase. Starting at 
$2749 million in 1980 and reaching $5154 million in 1993. One simple conclusion could 
be drawn from this fact: there was a demand for new movies and television shows. People 
wanted to watch more films and shows. This gave the production companies opportunity to 
produce more movies and earn more money. However, the average total releasing cost per 
film had increased dramatically in this period (1980- $13.7 million and 1993- $44.0 
million) as well.  The reason for that is simple: in the beginning of 1990 there was a fast 
development in the technology.  Digital technology changed the nature of the film. Special 
effects had become more popular, editing and projection of the movies had changed. 
Unfortunately these high-tech solutions were very expensive, that is why the cost of 
releasing a movie had increased that rapidly.  
 
3. Overview of the companies that were involved in the takeover battle  
 
This part of my thesis presents 3 companies: Paramount Communications, Viacom 
International and QVC. All information about the companies is collected from the period 
before the takeover battle and the acquisition. I will start with the Paramount 
Communications, because this is the target company. Then, I will move on to the 
companies that waged the battle: Viacom International and QVC Network Inc.  
 
 
                                                 
9
 Kaplan (1993) 
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3.1. Paramount Communications 
 
In 1983, Martin Davis became the Chief Executive Officer of the Paramount 
Communications replacing Charles Bludhorn. At that time the company was known as 
Gulf & Western and operated in many business segments. In the following couple of years 
Davis sold most of the operating businesses and focused on the publishing and 
entertainment businesses.  
Paramount Communications had two operating business segments: entertainment and 
publishing. The first segment provided 65% of total revenues and 62% of the operating 
profits. This business operated in motion picture production and distribution, television 
programming and prerecorded videocassettes. It maintained operations of motion picture 
theaters, independent television, regional theme parks, Madison Square Garden as well as 
in independent television stations and cable television networks. The second segment, 
which was publishing, included the publishing houses of Pocket Books, Prentice Hall, 
Simon & Schuster, Silver Burdett Ginn and Cumputer Curriculum Corporation. This 
segment also contained information operations such as manuals for accountants and other 
professionals as well as school text books. It provided 38% of Paramount’s operating 
profits.  
Between 1989 - 1993 Davis talked to many CEO’s of the entertainment companies about 
mergers and acquisitions. Most of the talks were futile because he found the target 
companies too expensive. Firstly he flirted with the British publisher - Reed. 
Unfortunately, the $4 billion merger fell through. Then, he wanted to buy 25% of a Dutch 
media company, called Elsevier. But this deal did not come into effect either. After that he 
started talks about potential mergers and acquisitions with record companies, such as: 
Bertelsmann, Geffen and PolyGram. Then the proposed partnership with Thorn-EMI, 
valued at $4, 5 billion fell through as well. Afterwards Davis tried to merge with Sony, 
McGraw-Hill, Gannett, AT&T, and Matsushita. In 1989 Davis made a well- publicized 
hostile takeover offer for Time Inc. This takeover, which was valued at more than $10 
billion, did not end up successfully either. Davis explored mergers with major TV 
networks, such as CapCities/ABC, CBS and NBC as well. But all of the potential mergers 
or agreements either blew apart at the very last moment or fell on the regulatory hurdles. 
At that time Paramount Communications was left without strategic alliances10.   
                                                 
10
 Steinbock (1995) 90 
12 
 
In 1993 Paramount Communication was the last studio that was in play. At that time Davis 
realized that his company no longer has to be the buyer. It could also be the seller.  
In 1989 Paramount Communication had $3.4 billion revenues and was one of the 
Hollywood’s leading media and entertainment companies. It was compared to Disney 
($4.6 billion) and MCA-Universal ($3.3 billion).  
The following table shows, how Paramount’s revenue, EBIT and EBIT margin have been 
changing between 1990 and 1993. 
 
Table 2: Paramount’s revenue, EBIT and EBIT Margin  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Entertainment 2,514.9 2,532.0 2,772.2 3,017.0 
Publishing 1,354.1 1,363.4 1,492.7 1,624.6 
Total revenue (mil) 3,869.0 3,895.4 4,264.9 4,641.6 
EBIT (mil) 381.0 179.7 397.3 317.3 
EBIT Margin 10% 7% 11% 9% 
Source: balance sheets of Paramount Communications and Paramount Communications Inc. – 1993, Steven N. Kaplan, 
University of Chicago 
 
 
There is a significant improve in the total revenues over the 4 years period. As well 
Entertainment Segment as Publishing Segment provided revenues, which were increasing 
from year to year. We see that Earnings before Interest and Tax and Earnings before 
Interest and Tax Margin did not improve. Moreover, it was even not stable over these 
years. Starting at $381.0 million in 1990, decreasing to $179.7 million in 1991, then 
increasing to $397.3 million in 1992 and increasing not really significantly one more time 
in 1993 to $317.3 million.  
Earnings before interest and tax are calculated by taking total revenues less the cost of 
sales and the operating expenses11. Cost of sales show costs, which are directly associated 
with the produced goods. It could be for example manufacturing costs. Operating expenses 
are costs related to the course of running the company. The reasons why EBIT and EBIT 
Margin was not stable and did not improve over this period were the cost of sales and 
operating expenses. In 1991 the drop in the EBIT was significant. It means that the costs 
related to the production of movies and TV shows increased dramatically. After this year it 
improved a lot, but in the last year there was an increase in the production costs and that is 
why it dropped again.  
                                                 
11
 Berk, DeMarzo (2007) 28 
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Right now I would like to turn to the two main companies, which were interested in 
acquiring Paramount Communications. The first one is Viacom International and the 
second is QVC Inc. 
 
3.2. Viacom International Inc.   
 
Viacom International Inc. was actually formed as a subsidiary of CBS. The reason for that 
was to manage returns of CBS programming. However, in 1970 the government made 
CBS to divest this subsidiary because of antitrust reasons. On June 9, 1987 Viacom was 
bought by Sumner Redstone for $3.4 billion. It was a highly-leveraged deal, which 
overcame a management-led leveraged buyout bid. Under these circumstances Redstone 
had to raise his offer three times before acquiring the company.  
For the next six years Redstone was trying to restructure Viacom’s debt, shed the assets, 
which were not essential and focused on expanding MTV and Nickelodeon franchises 
worldwide. By 1993, Redstone decided that he has to focus on larger strategic issues. That 
is why he was thinking of acquiring Paramount Communications.  
Viacom International was a communications and entertainment company that operated in 
four segments: Networks, Cable Television, Entertainment and Broadcasting12. In the table 
below there is shown how much revenues and operating profits provided each segment of 
the company:  
 
Table 3: Viacom’s segments 
Segment Revenues Operating Profits 
Networks 56% 49% 
Cable Television 22% 29% 
Entertainment  13% 14% 
Broadcasting 9% 8% 
Source: Paramount Communications Inc. – 1993, Steven N. Kaplan, University of Chicago 
 
The most profitable segment was the Networks segment, which provided 56% of the total 
revenues and 49% of the operating profits. On the other hand broadcasting segment 
provided only 9% of the revenues and 8% of the operating profits.  
                                                 
12
 Kaplan (1993) 
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The following table shows how the total revenues, EBIT and EBIT Margin have been 
changing in the period of 1990-1993. Total revenues are divided into segments. 
 
Table 4: Viacom’s revenues, EBIT and EBIT Margin  
Year 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Networks 895.8 958.5 1044.2 541.2 
Cable Television 351.9 376.6 410.2 212.6 
Entertainment 207.9 222.5 242.4 125.6 
Broadcasting  144.0 154 167.9 87.0 
Total revenue (mil) 1,599.6 1,711.6 1,864.7 966.4 
EBIT (mil) 70.4 8.2 155.6 183.0 
EBIT Margin 20% 7% 11% 9% 
Source: Viacom’s balance sheets and Paramount Communications Inc. -1993, Steven N. Kaplan, University of Chicago 
 
 
There could be drawn a conclusion from the above table, which is similar to Paramount. 
We see that revenues were improving from year to year in every single segment. There is a 
significant decrease in the total revenues in the last year, but besides that year the company 
proves that it had a stable growth in the total sales.  The decrease in total sales in the year 
1993 could be explained only in one way. Redstone, CEO of Viacom, was focusing on 
strategic issues. Producing and selling movies and TV shows was not as important as 
looking for potential companies, which he could acquire or merge with. That is why the 
decrease in total revenues was so significant in the last year preceding the acquisition.  
Turning to Earnings before Interest and Tax, we observe a significant decrease in both 
EBIT and EBIT Margin from year 1990 to 1991. It is related with increased operating 
expenses and cost of sales. Paramount had exactly the same drop in the EBIT and EBIT 
Margin in the year 1991. However, in 1992 EBIT increased from 8.2 to 155.6 and in 1993 
it has been improved by 20%.  
 
3.3. QVC Network Inc.  
 
Turning to the second potential buyer, which was QVC Network Inc., it marketed a range 
of consumer products, such as electronics, cosmetics, toys, jewelry and housewares. It was 
done through shopping channels broadcast to cable television subscribers and satellite dish 
receivers. QVC reached nearly 59 million households. The most valuable asset of the 
company was its chairman and the Chief Executive Officer - Barry Diller. I would like to 
15 
 
devote some time to this person, because he is an essential figure in the Paramount-
Viacom-QVC deal.  
In 1974 Diller was named as chairman and CEO of Paramount Pictures. During the next 
few years Diller and his good friend Michael Eisner made the company one of the best 
performing studios in the 1970s and 1980s. Paramount Pictures was run by Diller until 
early 1980s. Then he was replaced by Martin Davis. Many people think that Paramount 
Pictures was run the best, when Davis was the chairman and the CEO of the company. 
Afterwards Diller moved to the Fox television network. Once again he proved that he was 
really good in what he was doing. He made the Fox the fourth television network in the 
world. After that he moved on to QVC, where he had significantly and really well moved 
the image of the company13.  
Now, I would like to turn from people, who run QVC to the financial performance. As it 
was done before with Viacom and Paramount, I will present revenues, EBIT and EBIT 
Margin of the QVC in the following table: 
 
Table 5: QVC’s revenues, EBIT and EBIT Margin 
 1/31 1991 1/31 1992 1/31 1993 7/31 1993 
Revenues 776.0 921.8 1,070.6 535.7 
EBIT  17.0 52.9 108.7 60.7 
EBIT Margin 7% 9% 8% 6% 
Source: Paramount Communications Inc. -1993, Steven N. Kaplan, University of Chicago 
 
In QVC the tendency in total revenues is different comparing to Viacom. There is no 
significant decline in the total revenues in the beginning of 1993. QVC had a stable growth 
in total sales. Moreover, in the middle of 1993 the numbers suggested that there would be a 
slightly improvement in the total revenues by the end of the year.  
Turning to EBIT and EBIT Margin we see a huge increase from $52.9 million  to $108.7 
million  in year 1993.  QVC did not face the same problem as Paramount and Viacom. 
Besides the fact of increasing cost of sales and operating expenses, the company managed 
to have an increase in EBIT in 1993. Barry Diller, CEO of QVC, was known for being a 
very god businessman and probably thanks to his knowledge and experience, QVC faced 
an increase in EBIT in all three years period preceding the takeover battle.  
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 Steinbock (1995)  92 
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4. The Need for a Change  
 
In this chapter of my thesis I would like to check if there was a need for a change in 
Paramount Communication. It is checked from the financial and strategic point of view.  
 
4.1.  Financial needs for the takeover 
The figure below illustrates Paramount Communications’ and its main competitors’ 
financial performance during the three years preceding Viacom’s takeover. 
 
Table 6: Paramount Communications’ and Peers Financial Performance 1990-199214 
Year 1990 1991 1992 
Revenue Growth 
Paramount 
Communications 
1% 9% 9% 
Time Warner 4% 3% 7% 
News Corp. 25% -7% 5% 
CBS  -6% 15% 1% 
Median 6% 5% 5.5% 
EBIT Margin 
Paramount 
Communications 
10% 6% 11% 
Time Warner 10% 10% 10% 
News Corp. 15% 14% 16% 
CBS 2% 9% 5% 
Median 9% 10% 10% 
ROE 
Paramount 
Communications 
4% 8% 9% 
Time Warner 6% 5% 5% 
News Corp. 4% 8% 6% 
                                                 
14
 Revenue Growth = (Sales(t1) – Sales (t0))/sales(t0) 
    EBIT Margin = EBIT(Tn)/Sales(Tn) 
    ROE= Net income available to common equity holders (Tn) / Book value Total common equity (Tn) 
    ROA = EBIT (Tn) / Total Assets (Tn) 
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CBS na na na 
Median 5% 7% 7% 
ROA 
Paramount 
Communications  
5% 7% 8% 
Time Warner 5% 5% 6% 
News Corp. 5% 6% 7% 
CBS na na na 
Median 5% 6% 7% 
Source: Balance sheets and „Triumph and Erosion in the American Media and Entertainment Industries, Dan Steinbock  
 
 
In terms of revenue growth Paramount Communication had performed much better than its 
main competitors. Only in year 1990 Paramount Communications‘revenue growth was 
below the median. However after this year we can observe a significant improve in the 
revenue growth.  The EBIT margin could potentially unveil a difference in efficiency 
between Paramount and its peers. However, the EBIT margin is roughly in line with its 
peers and therefore gives no indication of an operating weakness at Paramount. 
Paramount’s return on equity (ROE) was only a little bit higher than its peers’ median and 
its return on assets (ROA) was only slightly better. As illustrated, on a company level, 
there was no strong indicator for a need of change in terms of revenue growth, efficiency 
or return. Paramount’s financial performance did not reveal any particular operating 
weaknesses. 
From the financial point of view there was no need for a change. But, besides the financial 
reasons, there are other reasons to acquire or merge as well.  
 
4.2.  Paramount’s and Peers’ Strategic Development 1980-1993 
 
“Around the globe, folks just can’t get enough of America“, wrote Fortune 
magazine in December 1990. „They may not want our hardware anymore- 
our cars, steel, or television sets. But when they want a jolt of popular 
culture – and they want more all the time – they increasingly turn to 
American software: our movies, music, TV programming, and home video, 
18 
 
which together now accounted for an annual trade surplus of some 
$8billion.“15 
 
The mergers and acquisitions market is distinguished also by merger waves. A merger 
wave is: “a peak of heavy activity followed by quite troughs of few transactions”. 16 
The takeover waves are mostly seen during economic expansions. We can observe a 
takeover wave during contractions or correlates with bull markets very rarely.  The 
managers are motivated to reshuffle assets through takeovers by the same economic and 
technological circumstances, which lead to bull markets. So, the conditions, which drive 
expansions, drive also peaks in merges and acquisitions activity. 17 
One of the main reasons for Paramount for a change was the fourth Mergers and 
Acquisitions Wave in America, which had started in the 80s. In the previous century, 
America experienced several mergers and acquisitions waves. The fourth wave had taken 
place from 1980 and lasted until 1990. At that time, the dollar value increased from $33 
billion to $254 billion. The M&A industry was the third most active in the dollar value. 
There were undertaken nearly 2000 transactions which were worth more than $89 billion18. 
From the top 100 deals of the 80s’, media and entertainment firms were mentioned in this 
ranking 11 times19.  
There were a number of strategic developments in the media & entertainment industry 
during the ten years preceding Paramount’s acquisition. All companies including 
Paramount have had a significant focus on making its content available to the huge 
audience and on improving the movies. Warner Bros. bought Lorimar- Telepictures and 
became the world’s largest distributor of TV programming. Furthermore Sony purchased 
Columbia, because it wanted to use Columbia’s massive film and TV library. It was 
supposed to help Sony to push new forms of hardware. Digital technology changed the 
entertainment and media industry. Sony invested lots of money in the studio operations 
that increased its market share. Thanks to these investments, the following movies were 
produced: “Total recall”, “Misery”, “Terminator 2”, “and Prince of Tides”. Turning to 
another company- Walt Disney had a brilliant track record at that time as well. It produced 
such movies as: “Honey”, “Turner and Hooch”, “Father and the Bride”. Paramount was to 
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follow this trend. By 1990 the company bought out top producers Don Simpson and Jerry 
Bruckheimer and produced “The hunt for Red October”, “Ghost” as well as “Addams 
Family”.  
Special effects, new ways of editing and projection of the movies have affected the cost of 
production of the movies.  Only the biggest companies with a huge capital and great 
producers were able to produce really good movies and TV shows. Therefore there was 
seen a need for a change for Paramount because of the merger and acquisition wave in the 
entertainment industry.  
The company was in line with its peers in terms of strategic development regarding new 
technology and gradual streamlining of the business.  
 
4.3. Other reasons for the takeover 
 
An investment in the stock market is usually a zero-NPV investment. The question that 
comes with this statement is: Why the bidder is willing to pay a premium for a company 
that it wants to acquire and still meet the requirements that the transaction is a positive-
NPV investment possibility? The answer is simple: Through the acquisition, the bidder is 
able to add the economic value, which could not be added by the individual investor. So in 
other words, the bidder is willing to pay the premium, because it is hoping for a large 
synergy.  
 
4.3.1. Economies of scale and scope 
 
“A firm is said to have economies of scale when its average cost falls as 
output increases. Economies of scope generalize the concept of economies 
of scale to the case of multiproduct firm. Economies of scale and scope are 
frequently used as an argument to defend a proposed merger. To assess the 
validity of the argument in each case, it is important to understand the 
sources of economies of scale, and assess whether they cannot be realized 
otherwise. 
Economies of scale, realized through a merger, may be the result of 
coordination of the (formerly separate) firm’s investments in physical 
capital- called long-run economies of scale. Other realizations of economies 
20 
 
of scale may, however, come already in the short run (when physical capital 
is held fixed)” 20. 
 
Thus, in Paramount Communication’s, QVC’s and Viacom’s case a reason for the 
acquisition was the synergy, which was to occur. A big firm can enjoy economics of scale 
or savings because of the high volume of the production, which is of course not available 
for a small firm. The more films the combined company would have produced, the lower 
the costs of the production of one film would have been.  
Big companies can also benefit from economies of scope. By combining the distribution 
and marketing of different types of similar goods, the company can make significant 
savings.  
In our case all of the companies, that were involved in the takeover battle operated in the 
same industry- entertainment industry. Thus, by the joint distribution and marketing of 
movies and TV shows produced, all companies could same money.  
 
4.3.2. Vertical integration 
 
“Vertical integration refers to the merger of two companies in the same 
industry that make products required at different stages of the production 
cycle.” 21 
 
A firm can conclude that it could improve its product if it had a direct control of the inputs, 
which are needed to make the goods. In the entertainment industry a vertical integration 
between two companies would be very beneficial for both firms, because usually the 
companies own all stages of the production process of TV shows and films. Starting with 
the development of the movie or TV show, through preproduction, production and post-
production, even down to the distribution. If Paramount was put with another company 
under central control, management could ensure that both firms work toward a common 
company objective.  
Vertical integration could lead to monopoly gains too. Merging or acquiring with a main 
rival helps a company to substantially reduce rivalry in the industry and therefore increase 
revenues. All three companies that are involved in the takeover battle operate in the same 
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industry and they were competitors for each other. By merging with each other they could 
reduce the competition in the film industry and could create a huge world’s leading media 
conglomerate.  
However, society as a whole suffers from the monopoly strategies, so almost all countries 
have antitrust law, which extents these activities. So, monopoly gains are no longer good 
and beneficial reasons for a takeover, because of the antitrust laws. 22  
 
4.3.3. Incremental growth  
 
An extremely important method of growing is growing through merger or acquisition. An 
incremental growth, which could occur through combining Paramount with QVC or 
Viacom, is an example of a soft synergy. It is really difficult to predict how much faster 
Paramount could grow after merging with Viacom and QVC. However, if Paramount 
wanted to achieve an incremental growth, it seemed to be wiser to have a takeover with 
Viacom. Viacom could add Networks and Cable Operators and thanks to that Paramount 
could show its movies in MTV. From the other hand, merger with QVC will not give 
Paramount such opportunities.  
 
4.3.4. Managerial motives to merge 
 
It is extremely difficult to quantify a soft synergy. Better management, which could appear 
after combining with Viacom or QVC, is an example of a soft synergy too. In this case 
Paramount would profit more from the takeover with QVC. Barry Diller, CEO of QVC, 
was the most valuable asset in the company. A QVC-Paramount combination would be a 
very content-driven combination. 
 
5. Consideration of Alternatives  
 
When Martin Davis, who was the CEO of Paramount Communication, realized that his 
company could be not only the buyer but also the seller, he met with Ted Turner and talked 
about a potential merger of Paramount and Turner Broadcasting. It was not the only 
opportunity, he had. In April 1993 he started negotiating with Viacom’s chairman- Sumner 
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Redstone.  At the same time he was talking to John Malone, who was the CEO of the cable 
and media giant Tele-Communications Inc. (TCI). The talks were about a quasi-merger - 
TCI was supposed to acquire 17% of Paramount Communication. In Mai 1993 there were 
several merger possibilities for Paramount. The Board of Directors had the following 
options: TCI, Turner and Viacom23.  
 
5.1. Paramount-Viacom 
 
In July 1993, Paramount and Viacom signed confidentiality statements but unfortunately 
the talks collapsed. Few months later, in September 1993 Davis agreed to this merger. 
Redstone, the owner and CEO of the Viacom Company, was to acquire Paramount 
Company for $8.2 billion ($69.14 a share). That was supposed to be a stock and cash deal. 
The following table shows the pro forma combination of the Paramount Viacom takeover, 
if Viacom had had acquired Paramount on the 14th of September 1993. 
 
Table 7: Pro Forma Combination- Paramount-Viacom Combination  
 Paramount 
(million) 
Viacom 
(million) 
Combined 
(million) 
Overlap 
(million) 
Entertainment 2,021 233 2,254 233 
Networks 187 1,143 1,330 187 
Cable TV 0 421 421 0 
Broadcasting 216 175 391 175 
Live Entertainment  634 0 634 0 
Publishing  1,667 0 1,667 0 
Total  4,725 1,972 6,697 595 
Source: Merrill Lynch Analyst Report, September 14, 1993 
 
The combined company would have 6 following segments: Entertainment, Networks, 
Cable TV, Broadcasting, Live Entertainment and Publishing. By comparing the overlap 
between the companies’ segments, it becomes clear, that the overlap is $595 million, which 
is equal to about 8% overlap. Viacom’s owner- Redstone- knew that there would appear 
real synergies among the assets of Paramount and Viacom. These synergies would occur, 
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because both Paramount and Viacom had businesses, which were complementary to each 
other. Another reason for the synergies was the fact that both of these firms were well 
known. Paramount-Viacom combination would have no rivals in the national TV 
distribution. It would possess all together 7 cable televisions and 12 broadcast stations. It 
would be also the world’s leading cable programmer, thanks to having networks such as 
Nickelodeon and MTV and it would be the major Hollywood studio as well. But this 
combination could bring together something more: creative talent, managerial resources, 
intellectual property and trademarks of Viacom and Paramount. Another advantage of this 
acquisition would be the cost reduction, because both of the companies operated in the 
same business.  There would occur economies of scale too. The more films they would 
have had produced, the lower the costs of the production of one film would have had been. 
Redstone strongly believed that there were opportunities for increased revenues from this 
combination. Firstly, it would occur from cross-promotion and utilization of the both 
companies’ well-known brand names. He meant using Viacom’s Showtime, Nickelodeon 
brands to increase Paramount’s live entertainment segment. Secondly, he thought that 
increased revenues would come from the utilization of distribution capabilities of each firm 
to distribute products of the other. A good example could be: distributing Paramount’s 
theatrical motion picture library on a new or already existing cable network, which was 
owned by Viacom24.  
This combination would definitely bring synergies and the companies would benefit from 
technological and other developments in the distribution and form of entertainment 
programming. The last but not least advantage from the Paramount-Viacom acquisition 
would be the fact that both companies wanted to pursue international business strategies. It 
would result in an intensely enhanced international existence.  
 
5.2. Paramount-QVC 
 
About a week after Viacom’s bid, QVC announced a $9.5 billion ($80-a-share) hostile bid 
for Paramount. QVC had two main shareholders at that time - Comcast and Liberty Media- 
TCI. Each of those two shareholders put up $500 million to back the QVC’s offer. 
Paramount had exactly, what QVC was looking for: film library, movie studios, publishing 
house, and TV programs and sports teams. There were several advantages, which would 
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appear, if Paramount merged with QVC. These advantages were different from those of 
Paramount-Viacom combination.  
As it was mentioned before, the most valuable asset of QVC was its CEO Barry Diller. A 
QVC-Paramount combination would be more content-driven comparing to Paramount-
Viacom combination. It was expected that Diller would probably change the way 
Paramount did business. Observers said that Diller would probably have sold the theme 
parks and TV stations and he would have concentrated on programming. At the same time 
it was expected from Diller to enhance flow of Paramount films completed at lower costs. 
There were rumors that Diller wanted to start a new television network.25 The QVC-
Paramount combination would probably bring new television channels and fifth television 
network. This merger would help TCI to satisfy its customers, who were willing to watch 
high-visibility programs.  
The following table (Table 8) shows the pro forma combination of the hypothetical 
Paramount - QVC acquisition and the overlap between the different segments of these two 
companies.  
 
Table 8: Pro Forma Combination- Paramount-QVC Combination  
 Paramount 
(million) 
QVC 
(million) 
Combined 
(million) 
Overlap 
(million) 
Entertainment 2,021 0 2,021 0 
Networks 187 1,200 1,387 187 
Cable TV 0 0 0 0 
Broadcasting 216 0 216 0 
Live Entertainment 634 0 634 0 
Publishing 1,667 0 1,667 0 
Total 4,725 1,200 5,925 187 
Source: Merrill Lynch Analyst Report, September 14, 1993 
 
It becomes clear that the hard synergy, which could occur from the combination 
Paramount-QVC, was much smaller than from the combination Paramount-Viacom. 
Overlap of $187 million, which makes about 4%, is smaller than the overlap in Viacom, 
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which was 8%. But, as it was mentioned earlier, from Paramount-QVC merger, there was 
expected not had synergy, but soft synergy, especially managerial improvement.  
 
6. The Hostile Battle 
 
Right now I would like to concentrate on the hostile takeover battle between QVC and 
Viacom.  
Redstone wanted to kill two birds with one stone – bring down John Malone, the CEO of 
Telecommunications Inc. (as it was mentioned before TCI was one of the two main 
shareholders of QVC) and win Paramount26.  
Paramount’s management did not meet with QVC, although they were authorized by the 
Board of Directors to do that. They were waiting for a new offer from Viacom. However, 
Viacom concentrated on the TCI’s case.   
“In the American cable industry, one man has… seized monopoly power. Using bullyboy 
tactics and strong-arming of competitors, suppliers and customers, that man has inflicted 
injury on …. Virtually every American consumer of cable services and technologies. That 
man is John C. Malone.”27 This is what Redstone said in Viacom’s antitrust suit against 
TCI. He actually hoped to bring down John C. Malone, his main competitor. He also hoped 
that he could get Paramount. In fact, the competitor relationship between QVC and 
Viacom renew the talks with Viacom. Viacom was ready to acquire Paramount, but Davis 
– Paramount’s CEO- was suspicious about the Viacom’s sufficient financial assets, that is 
why, he wanted to see the “proof of financing”. Otherwise he was not willing to have any 
talks with Viacom.  
Few days later, in the end of September 1993 Viacom got $600 million from Blockbuster 
to win the bid.  In October 1993, Viacom obtained additional $1.2 billion commitment 
from Nynex, which was a telephone company that served five New England states as well 
as New York state, from 1984 through 1997. The company also operated cable television 
and telephone services in the United Kingdom. The reason why Viacom got that money 
was very simple. Nynex wanted Viacom to win the battle. The companies sweetened the 
bid by adding additional money. But it was not the end of the battle. Meanwhile Bell 
Atlantic announced it would buy TCI and Liberty.   This deal gave a financial muscle to 
the QVC’s offer. Furthermore, Advance Publications, newspaper and magazine publisher, 
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and Cox Enterprises, a newspaper and cable television company, said that they would back 
the QVC’s bid with $500 million each. 
What happened in the meantime was unexpected. On the October 21st QVC announced a 
hostile tender offer. It was willing to get 51% of Paramount at the price of $80 a share and 
$1.43 for every remaining share of Paramount. Paramount and QVC had not had to wait 
long for the Viacom’s respond. Three days later, Viacom offered a $80-a-share cash bid for 
51% of Paramount. Viacom was offering its stock for the remaining 49%28.  
The takeover battle moved at that time to the courts. On the October, 28th QVC put 
forward a motion in Daleware Chancery Court looking for preliminary injunction to stop 
the merger between Paramount and Viacom. The company wanted to use the "poison pill" 
takeover defenses, which would support Viacom. QVC was of the opinion that the 
Paramount’s Board performed improperly, because it did not exercise the Revlon duties 
and it allowed defensive measures to grant Viacom. The defensive measures were for 
instance: termination fees, lucrative stock options and lock up options29.  
After that, the time has come for Viacom’s answer. It raised its offer from $80 to $85-a-
share for 51% of Paramount. The company stayed with the offer of buying the remainder 
with the stock.  
When Viacom raised its bit, QVC raised the cash part of its bid as well. The total value of 
the cash part was worth $90 a share.  At that time new companies decided to support the 
bid. BellSouth Corp agreed to invest $1.5 billion in QVC to back its bid. At the same time 
Liberty Media agreed to sell its stake to QVC under the condition it won control of 
Paramount. However, Paramount’s Board of Directors recommended their shareholders to 
reject QVC’s $90-a-share bid.  
By mid-November, there were some arguments in the Daleware Chancery Court on the 
QVC’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Court’s decision was to grant the QVC the 
preliminary instruction blocking Paramount’s “poison pill plan”30 (there will be a little bit 
more about the poison pill in the next paragraph) and stroked down "lock up" options, 
which were worth $500 million. On the 9th of December the Delaware Supreme Court 
stranded by the Chancery Court decision and set the stage for an auction process of 
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Paramount. Paramount had to withdraw its support for the Viacom bid and at that time the 
auction process started31.  
I would like to concentrate now on the Paramount’s poison pill plan. If there is a hostile 
takeover and a company is a target, it is obvious that managers are often faced with the 
choices, which are not really comfortable. Hostile takeover have one main benefit for the 
shareholders. It allows them to get substantial financial gains. However, it has a main 
disadvantage for the managers as well. It usually results in losing jobs by the managers. 
That is why they often try to protect their own interest at the great expense of stockholders. 
One of the ways, which helps the managers to protect themselves in a hostile takeover, is a 
poison pill32.  
 
“Firms sometimes create poison pills, which are triggered by hostile 
takeovers. The objective is to make it difficult and costly to acquire control. 
A flip over right offers a simple example. In a flip over right, existing 
stockholders get the right to buy shares in the firm at a price well above the 
current stock price. As long as the existing management runs the firm; this 
right is not worth very much. If a hostile acquirer takes over the firm, 
though, stockholders are given the right to buy additional shares at a price 
much lower than the current stock price. The acquirer, having weighed in 
this additional cost, may very well decide against the acquisition”33.  
 
Managers of Paramount prepared during the hostile battle a poison pill plan, which was 
unfortunately blocked by the Delaware Supreme Court. 
 
6.1. Not exercised Revlon duties and the defensive measures such as lock up 
options and termination fees 
 
One of the most important sets of directives and rules in the mergers and acquisition case 
law is known as the “Revlon duties”. Two cases: Paramount Communication Inc. vs. QVC 
Network Inc. and Revlon Inc. vs. MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings helped to establish 
these directives.  
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“The essential premise of the Revlon duties is that in the context of a sale of 
a company, the board has a duty to maximize value of the company for the 
benefit of the shareholders. In a sense, this is contrary to the boards’ day-
to-day obligations, as the board is now faced with an immediate decision to 
maximize the shareholder value rather than a long-term strategic process to 
deliver shareholder value. The board’s responsibility shifts from preserving 
the corporation for long-term benefit to maximizing the value of the 
company in the sale to the shareholders’ benefit”34.  
 
In Delaware Supreme Court’s opinion, since the Paramount Board of Directors had 
decided to sell control, they were obliged to search for the best option to their shareholders. 
This obligation contained the responsibility to evaluate critically both the Viacom and the 
QVC offer. This critical evaluation’s purpose was to determine, if the QVC tender offer 
was conditional. It also investigated if the offers could have been improved and if yes 
under which circumstances. The purpose of this investigation was to determine if all 
important information was available for consideration of the Paramount’s Board of 
Directors and if there were realistic possibilities of actions of the Board of Directors. The 
last thing that was investigated was to determine if the directors had enough time to 
consider the materials carefully35.  
The takeover defenses are very useful tactics in the takeover battles. It helps the Board of 
Directors to get a higher price. But also in a hostile takeover it gives the board time to find 
a “friendly buyer” or other reasonable solution. There are several defensive tactics that 
were used in Paramount-Viacom-QVC battle: termination fees, lock-up options and 
lucrative stock options. 
 
„Unknown less than 15 years ago, termination fees (otherwise called kill 
fees) are now a commonplace component of merger and takeover 
agreements. Such fees typically require target firms to pay a monetary 
consideration to bidders if a merger or takeover agreement is broken.“ 36. 
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Viacom wanted a termination fee because it spent time, energy and its name in this 
acquisition war. But the time and reputation invested in the takeover battle were not the 
only reasons why the company demanded termination fee. The second reason was a fact, 
that a termination fee makes the bid much more expensive for the other bidders. If there 
was a new bidder, it had to pay Viacom the termination fee.  
 
Another defensive tactic used in the battle was a lock-up option: 
 
“Lock-up options are provisions drafted to favor an acquirer with whom the 
target company has signed a defensive agreement. They give the acquirer 
the right to purchase stock or assets of the target under certain 
circumstances. The goal of a lock-up is to discourage third party offers, in 
particular hostile third parties”. 37  
 
The main objective of this defensive tactic was to disfavor QVC. A lock-up option makes a 
hostile bid very hard.  
 
6.2.  Auction Process  
 
Around the mid of December Paramount could not support Viacom anymore and it opened 
an auction. The company set up the bid system and called for bids by the 20th December 
deadline. By the 20th of December both Paramount and QVC submitted their bids to 
Paramount. QVC’s bid was higher and that is why Paramount’s Board of Directors 
recommended merging with QVC. QVC was willing to pay $92 a share in cash for 
Paramount’s 51% and the rest in stock. However, Paramount gave some additional days to 
Viacom to increase its bid. In the beginning of January Viacom announced that it wanted 
to merge with the Blockbuster in an $8.4 billion deal. “Viacom-Blockbuster” offered $105 
in cash for 50.1% of Paramount’s stock. The rest was supposed to be purchased with 
Viacom’s stock. Viacom valued the total offer at $79.25 a share.  The Viacom-Blockbuster 
synergies were seen only on the balance sheet. The main reason for that was the fact, that 
the video retailer had a debt-free financial structure. Blockbuster was at that time an all-
equity firm.  Unfortunately, the operational synergies were not seen at all. Redstone (CEO 
of Viacom) needed this merger to win Paramount. Wayne Huizenga, Blockbuster’s CEO, 
wanted to merge with Viacom because he had a hope to exit from the home video industry- 
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“industry bound to decline with electronic superhighways38”. However, Paramount’s 
Board of Directors recommended its shareholders to reject the Viacom’s bid. At that time 
the QVC bid was still preferred39.  
 
6.3. Epilogue: the End of the Bidding War 
 
On the 12th of January 1994, Paramount’s Board of Directors rejected Viacom’s $9.3 
billion takeover bid. About a week later Viacom raised its bid to $107 a share and it added 
a financial instrument to secure the value of the securities fraction of its offer. So, on that 
day Viacom’s offer included $107 per share in cash for 50.1% of Paramount’s shares and 
for the remaining 49, 9% Viacom increased its offer in a second-step merger to: 
• “0.93065 shares of Viacom Class B Common Stock, 
• 0.93065 CVRs40, 
• 0.5 Viacom Three-Year Warrants 
• 0.3 Viacom Five-Year Warrants  
• and $17.50 in principal amount of Viacom Merger Debentures with an 8% coupon 
and 12 year maturity if the Blockbuster-Viacom merger was approved. If the 
merger was not approved, the debentures would be replaced with $17.50 face value 
of Viacom preferred stock with a 5% dividend yield”41 
Paramount’s Board of Directors found this offer really attractive and that is why it ended 
the merge pact with QVC, even though in meantime QVC increased its offer as well. QVC 
was offering $104 per share in cash for 50.1% of Paramount’s shares and: 
• “1.2361 shares of QVC Common Stock, 
• 0.2386 shares of New QVC Merger Preferred Stock, 
• and 0.32 ten-year warrants for each remaining Paramount share in a second step 
merger”41. 
Paramount’s Board of Directors recommended the Viacom’s offer to its shareholders42.  
On 13th of February QVC’s CEO, Diller, said that he is not willing to alter his bid for 
Paramount, thus on the 15th of February Viacom could claim victory. On that day Diller 
said:  
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“They won. We lost. Next.” 
 
Finally, Viacom bought Paramount for $10 billion. It was approximately $2 billion more 
than the original offer. The whole takeover battle lasted 5 months43.  
On the day when Viacom won the takeover battle, so on the 15th of February 1994, 
Viacom’s B share’s value decreased to $28.00, Viacom’s A share’s value fall to $34.125. 
QVC share price increased to $50.25 per share and Paramount was traded at $77.00 per 
share44.  
The combined company was run by Sumner Redstone. The new CEO of the Viacom-
Paramount was Frank J. Biondi, who has been Sumner’s right-hand man for a long time. 
When the acquisition was finalized, Redstone had control over the 75% of the votes. He 
overtook with Frank J. Biondi the whole control over the combined company, which meant 
that Paramount’s chairman, Martin Davis and his second-in-command, Stanley Jaffe, were 
out.  
In the beginning of March Jonathan Dolgen was named to run the movie and television 
division of Paramount. Dolgen was earlier a president of Sony Motion Pictures Group, but 
when Redstone made him the offer to run the division, he accepted it immediately.  Dolgen 
was known of being a really good businessman and steely negotiator.  
Viacom paid for Paramount almost $2 billion more, than it was agreed in September 1993, 
when the companies started the negotiations. That is why it was expected from Viacom to 
shed certain of the Paramount’s assets. In this way it could raise some cash, which it spent, 
while buying Paramount.  Indeed, in late April, Viacom announced that it was willing to 
sell several units in its information and software department. Redstone shed the following 
assets: the Madison Square Garden was shed to Charles Dolan’s Cablevision and Simon & 
Schuster’s educational publishing units were shed to Pearson Plc. Both deals were valued 
to almost $4 billion.  
The value of the Viacom’s share was falling down and that is “why the prospects clouded 
for the acquisition of Blockbuster”45.  In the beginning of May 1994 Harry Huzenga, who 
was the man, who grew Blockbuster Video sent information to its shareholder and said: 
“Could be no assurance the board could recommend a transaction with Viacom”. Huizenga 
was at that time acting like an investor and not like a decisive player. Through this action 
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his stockholders became worried about the Viacom investment and they started thinking 
that Blockbuster might have lost more than it could have gained.46 
Viacom started new investments, when it acquired Paramount.  “The company joined 
Nynex in exploring video-on-demand possibilities for the vast Viacom and Paramount film 
and TV libraries”. It began developing multiplayer video games and started creating 
interactive versions of Viacom’s cable television, such as VH-1, MTV, and Nickelodeon47.  
Even if Viacom’s initial transaction with Blockbuster was not going to happen as it was 
planned, it did not threaten the takeover of Paramount- that was complicated by “block 
bummer” deal.  
Redstone was a really good CEO and he knew how to run a business. He turned Viacom’s 
expenditures into real profit. Under the command of Redstone, Paramount had the best 
performance ever. It produced during these 10 years such films as: “Saving Private Ryan”, 
“Titanic”, “Brave heart” and “Forrest Gump”.   
 
7. Viacom’s shareholders opinion about the acquisition with Paramount  
 
QVC and Viacom were leading the bidding war for more than 5 months. Starting in 
September 1993 and ending on the 15th of February, when Viacom’s final bid was 
accepted. Right now I would like to concentrate on the investors’ point of view of the 
acquisition. On the day, when Viacom announced the bid for the first time, the company’s 
share dropped by 6.8 per cent and the Standard and Poor’s Index dropped by 0.4 per cent. 
Viacom’s shares were affected by the change in the market index as follows48: 
 
		
			 = 	 +  ∗ 	
					= 0.01 + 0.78 * return on 
market 
 
As we see, the alfa is equal to 0.01. This numer could be interpreted as follows: Viacom’s 
shares increased on average by 0.01 per cent per day, when the market index was 
unchaned. Turning to the beta, we see that it was equal to 0.78, which means that whenever 
the market index increased by one per cent, it  leaded to an additional 0.78 per cent 
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Viacom’s return. On the day, when Viacom made its bid for Paramount, the market 
decreased by 0.4 percent. So, the expected return on Viacom was equal to: 
 
		
			 =0.01 + 0.78 * (-0.4)=-0.3 per cent.  
 
Now, we can calculate the abnormal return on the Viacom’s share, which is equal to  
-6.5%.  
 
			
	 = 
		
	 − 		
	 = −6.8 − −0.3! = −6.5%  
 
Just before the bid Viacom was worth  around $7.9 billion. We can easily calculate that the 
abnormal decrease in the value of the company’s shares was equal to: 
0.065*7.9 billion, which is equal to $515 million.  
If we accumulate the daily abnormal returns, we can observe Viacom’s stock performance 
over a longer period. If Viacom’s abnormal return was on one day equal to +5 per cent and 
on the next day its abnormal return was equal to +6 per cent, the company’s cumulative 
abnormal return would be equal to 11.3% (1.05*1.06-1=0.113).   
The following graph shows the cummulative abnormal performance of Viacom’s stock 
during the period 1993-1995. There was marked in the graph the day, when Viacom made 
the initial bid for Paramount and the day, when it acqually won the takeover battle.  
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Figure1: Cumulative abnormal returns from Viacom stock around the time of its takeover battle for Paramount  
 
Source: Financing and risk management, Richard A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers, Stewart Myers, Brattle Group 
 
The abnormal return for the period between the initial bid and the acquistion was - 50%. 
We can easily calculate that Viacom’s stock  value dropped to $4 billion during this 
periode. It is obvious, that when Viacom’s value decreased almost by 50%, Paramount’s 
shareholders were not really happy with the Viacom’s stock, which was offered to them. 
Another thing is, that if Viacom really wanted to win Paramount it had to increase the 
amount of cash on the offer. Also, the company had to guaranee that it would repurchase 
the stock from Paramount’s investors if it decreased below a specified price.  
We should notice here one very important thing. The market’s respond to the bid, should 
have suggested managers, that the shareholders were not happy with the proposed 
acquisition and that they found it as a very poor deal. We see in the graph, that Viacom’s 
price was falling during this period significantly, which means that management had clear 
and laud messages, that investors did not want this acquisition. Of course, we could 
assume, that management had additional information, which shareholders did not have, and 
that is why there was an information asymmetry, but usually the stock price performance 
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gives the information about the shareholders’ point of view. In our case, the investors did 
not wat to acquire with Paramount49.   
 
8. Paramount Valuation as a standalone company using the DCF Model 
 
 “The DCF valuation can be described as a mathematical concept which 
seeks to estimate the present value of an entity or the whole company by 
discounting expected future free cash flow streams by an appropriate 
discount rate reflecting the expectations of the market. It has been 
introduced by Nobel Prize winners Merton Miller and Franco Modigliani in 
1961. 50”  
 
In the work of Rappaport (1998) we can find the definition of the entity model of the DCF 
Valuation: “The total economic value (corporate value) of an entity such as a company or 
business unit is the sum of the values of its debt and its equity….Corporate value consists 
of two basic components: the present value of FCF from operations during the forecast 
period, and the residual or continual value, which represents the present value of the 
business attributable to the period beyond the forecast period.51”  
 
8.1. Capital Structure  
 
The capital structure applies to the way a company finances its assets through some 
combination of equity, debt or hybrid securities.  In other words the capital structure of the 
company is the composition of the company’s liabilities.  
In Paramount’s case the total debt in 1993 was calculated from the long term financial debt 
($1.002, 9 million) and the current maturities of the long term debt ($10, 1 million). So the 
total debt is equal to $1.013million.  
The equity was calculated as a market capitalization, by using the following formula: 
 
Equity= Market Capitalization = Share price × Number of Shares Outstanding 
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To calculate the market value of equity the number of outstanding shares is multiplied by 
the share price. The total number of shares outstanding was at that time 120 million.  We 
can easily calculate the total market value of equity, which was worth: 
 
Market Value of Equity= $55,552 x 120.000.000= $6.660.000.000 
 
Having the value of equity and the value of debt, we can easily calculate the current debt-
to-equity ratio and the debt-to-value ratio for Paramount in 1993.  
D/E = 1.013/6.660 million = 15% 
D/V = 1.013/(6.660+1.013) million = 13% 
However, while using the WACC method, Paramount’s debt-to-equity ratio has to be 
constant. It means that Paramount adjusts its leverage to carry on a constant debt-to-equity 
ratio in terms of market values.  This policy implies that the risk of the company’s debt and 
equity and its weighted average cost of capital will not change because of the leverage 
fluctuations. It also shows the amount of debt the company will employ when it undertakes 
a new project or investment.53 
The optimal capital structure will be determined by an industry peer group comparison. 
When computing the optimal capital structure of the industry, there will be growth, return 
and asset of the companies compared. If these factors are quite similar across the peer 
group, market forces will push the companies in the industry toward an effective and 
optimal capital structure.54 
Paramount’s debt-to-equity ratio and the debt to value ratio seem to be a little bit lower 
comparing to the whole industry. Davis, Paramount’s CEO, was responsible for the low 
debt-to-equity and debt-to-value ratios. When he was the CEO of the company, Paramount 
had lots of excess cash and very little debt. This has a number of benefits but also 
drawbacks. Lower geared companies have lower probability of bankruptcy, but also 
financial distress is lower, and the advantage from debt overcomes the cost. The 
companies’ shares have lower volatility of equity returns since lower interest on the debt 
must be paid before paying returns to the shareholders. But, since the interest rate paid on 
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debt financing is tax deductible, debt is much cheaper than the equity. So, a company 
usually will borrow because of the valuable interest tax shield.  
Since, Paramount’s debt-to-equity and debt-to-value ratios are a little bit lower comparing 
to the other companies in the industry; we can easily assume a constant debt-to-equity ratio 
for the industry at 25%. Constant means that it intends to maintain a similar ratio for the 
foreseeable future.  
 
8.2. Weighted Average Cost of Capital  
 
According to Jonathan Berg and Peter DeMarzo Weighted Average Cost of Capital is 
described as: 
 
“The average of a firm’s equity and after tax cost of capital, weighted by the 
fraction of the firm’s enterprise value that corresponds to equity and debt, 
respectively” 55 
 
In other words, WACC is the cost of capital, which is the weighted average of the costs of 
different components (equity and debt) used for the financing of a firm. To calculate 
WACC, the following formula will be used: 
 
$%% = &' ∗

 + ( + &) ∗ 1 − ! ∗
(
 + ( 
 
Cost of equity )( eK is the required rate of return by shareholders on their investments for 
the risk they face. To calculate cost of equity for Paramount the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model is used: 
)( fmfe rrrK −+= β
 
 
Cost of debt )( dK is the required rate of return by debt holders on their investments (i.e. 
cost of borrowing funds). It should be noted that cost of equity should be greater than cost 
of debt, as shareholders face greater risks. The formula for cost of debt is:  
dK = fr +	%+	(,
	-	 + %
	+	(,
	-	. 
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8.2.1. Risk Free Rate 
 
The risk free rate )( fr represents the rate of return earned by investing in the risk-free asset. 
Although in reality everybody knows there are no risk free investments, it can be 
approximated by taking the yield on short dated government bonds. This can be equated to 
the yield on short dated US T-Bonds. The geometric average of the T-bond returns over 
past 60 years is 5.68%56.  
 
8.2.2. Risk Premium 
 
The risk premium )( fm rr − represents the excess of market returns over the returns of risk-
free assets. It is calculated based upon S&P 500’s return with added dividend yield minus 
risk free rate based on annual returns for the years: 1960-199457.  
 
Table 9: Annual returns for the years: 1960-1994 
Year Earnings Yield (%) Dividend Yield (%) 
1960 5,34 3,41 
1961 4,71 2,85 
1962 5,81 3,4 
1963 5,51 3,13 
1964 5,62 3,05 
1965 5,73 3,06 
1966 6,74 3,59 
1967 5,66 3,09 
1968 5,51 2,93 
1969 6,63 3,52 
1970 5,98 3,46 
1971 5,46 3,1 
1972 5,23 2,7 
1973 8,16 3,7 
1974 13,64 5,43 
1975 8,55 4,14 
1976 9,07 3,93 
1977 11,43 5,11 
1978 12,11 5,39 
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1979 13,48 5,53 
1980 11,04 4,74 
1981 12,39 5,57 
1982 9,83 4,93 
1983 8,06 4,32 
1984 10,07 4,68 
1985 7,42 3,88 
1986 5,96 3,38 
1987 6,49 3,71 
1988 8,69 3,68 
1989 6,88 3,32 
1990 6,86 3,74 
1991 4,63 3,11 
1992 4,79 2,9 
1993 5,77 2,72 
1994 6,91 2,91 
SUM 266,16 132,11 
SUM/Number of 
years 7,60 3,77 
Source: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/spearn.htm 
 
R/ = 7,60 + 3,77 = 11,37 
In our case market risk is equal to 11.37. And since risk free rate is equal to 5.68% the risk 
premium, is 5.69%.  
 
8.2.3. Beta  
 
The beta )(β measures the sensitivity of returns on the security to changes in systematic 
factors. Paramount’s levered beta is equal to 158.To calculate WACC correctly, this beta 
has to be unlevered and then re-levered again. A firm’s asset beta is equal to the weighted 
average of its debt beta and equity beta: 
2 =

 + (
3 +
(
 + (
4 
 
The unlevered (asset) beta measures the market risk of the company’s underlying assets. 
That is why it could be used to value the cost of capital for comparable projects or 
investments. If a company changes its capital structure but it does not change its projects or 
investments, its asset beta remains unchanged. However, we have to be aware, that 
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company’s equity beta will alter to show the consequence of the capital structure change 
on its risk59. If the current D/E ratio is 0 then	3 = 1 = 5	.  
Hence, the cost of equity is equal to: 
 
&' = &6 = 5.68% + 1 ∗ 5.69% = 11.37% 
 
However, to calculate WACC properly, we have to calculate the new equity beta, since the 
debt to equity ratio has changed and it is not equal to zero. The new equity beta will be 
calculated using the following formula: 
3 = 5 +
(
 5 − 4! 
 
Two cases will be considered: for the debt equity ratio equals to 25% and 35%.Suppose 
that Paramount’s debt-to-equity ratio is 0.25 and it has an equity beta of 1 and a debt beta 
of zero. Company’s equity beta after re-leveraging is equal to: 
 
3 = 5 + 43 5 − 4! = 1 + 0.25 ∗ 1-0) = 1.25 
 
If there is an assumption that the debt-to-equity ratio changes to 0.35 the new equity beta is 
equal to: 
3 = 5 +
(
 5 − 4! = 1 + 0.35 ∗ 1 − 0! = 1.35 
 
We can see that Paramount’s equity beta increases with the leverage. Also cost of equity 
increases, when beta increases: 
&' = 5.68% + 1.25 ∗ 5.69% = 12.79% 
&' = 5.68% + 1.35 ∗ 5.69% = 13.36% 
While determining the cost of equity, we observe that beta has a significant effect. The 
higher the beta, the higher the cost of equity.  
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Turning to the cost of debt, we easily calculate that if the company’s debt-to-equity ratio is 
equal to 25%, the company default spread is equal to 1.37%60  and its rating is AA. The 
country default spread for the United States of America was zero61; hence cost of debt is 
equal to: 
 
&) = 5,68% + 1,37% = 7,05% 
 
However, if the debt-to-equity ratio increases, company’s default spread increases as well 
and at the same time its rating decreases. The following table shows, which impact has the 
capital structure on the cost of debt: 
 
Table10: Impact of the debt-to-equity ratio on the cost of debt  
D/E Credit Rating Cost of Debt 
25% AA 7,05% 
43% A 7,24% 
67% BBB 7,59% 
100% BB 9,00% 
150% B 10,75% 
 
The higher the debt-to-equity ratio, the lower the credit rating and the higher the cost of 
debt.  
 
8.2.4. Tax 
 
Tax- the following table shows the historical tax rate for the years 1990-1993. The average 
tax over this period was taken to calculate WACC.   
     Table11: Tax rate for the period: 1990-1993 
Year  1990 1991 1992 1993 Average 
Historical tax rate 32% 37% 31% 34% 34% 
 
Since we have the cost of equity, cost of debt and we know the capital structure of 
Paramount, we can calculate weighted average cost of capital.  
In the following table all of the above information was cumulated: unleveraged beta, 
leveraged beta, cost of equity, cost of debt, credit rating and WACC. As it was said earlier 
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the higher the debt-to-value and debt-to-equity ratios the higher the cost of equity and cost 
of debt. Second observation is, that the higher the leverage the lower the credit rating.  
 
Table12: Impact of the debt-to-equity ratio on WACC 
D/(D+E) E/(D+E) D/E βe βa-unlev. βe- relev. Cost of Equity Rating  Cost of Debt  WACC 
20% 80% 25% 1,00 1,00 1,25 12,79% AA 7,05% 11,16% 
30% 70% 43% 1,00 1,00 1,43 13,81% A 7,24% 11,10% 
40% 60% 67% 1,00 1,00 1,67 15,16% BBB 7,59% 11,10% 
50% 50% 100% 1,00 1,00 2,00 17,06% BB 9,00% 11,50% 
60% 40% 150% 1,00 1,00 2,50 19,91% B 10,75% 12,22% 
                    
 
The following graph illustrates how the WACC changes, when the leverage of the 
company increases. There is a small decrease in WACC when the company changes its 
debt-to-value ratio form 20% to 30%. WACC stays at the same level, when the company 
changes its debt-to-value ratio from 30% to 40%. However, an increase from 40% to 50% 
and to 60% has got a significant impact on WACC, which is equal to 11,50% and 12,22% 
respectively.  
Figure 2: Impact of the leverage of the company on WACC 
 
 
There was an assumption made that the industry debt-to-equity ratio is 25%. For this ratio, 
the WACC is equal to 11, 16%. This number percentage will be used for the valuation as a 
discount rate.  
 
 
 
 
10,40%
10,60%
10,80%
11,00%
11,20%
11,40%
11,60%
11,80%
12,00%
12,20%
12,40%
20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
WACC
WACC
43 
 
8.3. Value of the Firm 
 
Because Paramount was at that time in the process of changing, the best way to value the 
company is using the FCFF model. This approach provides the most accurate estimates of 
value. The present value of the Paramount as a stand-alone company will be calculated 
using the following model:62 

	,	9	 =: 9%99;1 +$%%!;
;<=
;<>
+
9%99=?>$%% − @=
1 +$%%!=  
 
Where: 
FCFF- Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
WACC- Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
g-growth rate  
 
8.3.1. Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
 
The following table shows Paramount’s Cash Flow forecast as a stand-alone company for 
the period 1994-1998. Earnings before Interest and Tax (EBIT) were calculated by 
subtracting cost of goods sold, depreciation, selling expenses and administrative expenses 
from revenues (sales). Free cash flow to the firm has been calculated by using earnings 
before interest and tax as a basis.  
To calculate Free Cash Flow to the Firm the following formula was used: 
 
FCFF= EBIT*(1-tax rate) + Depreciation – Capital Expenditures – Change in Working 
Capital.  
Table 13: Free Cash Flow Calculation for the years: 1994-1998 
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Sales 4 905,00   5 264,30   5 648,60   6 060,00   6 500,70   
EBITDA 660,60   737,00   790,80   848,40   910,10   
Depreciation -162,00   -172,00   -184,00   -196,00   -209,00   
EBIT 498,60   565,00   606,80   652,40   701,10   
Tax 34% -169,52   -192,10   -206,31   -221,82   -238,37   
EBIT(1-t) 329,08   372,90   400,49   430,58   462,73   
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Operating CF 491,08   544,90   584,49   626,58   671,73   
Capex -160,10   -177,30   -176,70   -202,90   -216,60   
∆ in working capital -45,60   -62,10   -66,50   -71,20   -76,20   
Asset sale 900,00   
FCFF 285,38   1 205,50   341,29   352,48   378,93   
FCFF/Discount rate  256,73   975,60   248,47   230,86   223,26   
 
If we assume, that Paramount reached a steady state after 1998 and it started growing at a 
stable growth rate at	@= = 0,05, we can easily calculate terminal value, which is equal to: 
 
9%99=?>$%% − @=
1 +$%%!= 	= 	
397,88
0,1116 − 0,05
1 + 0,1116!B = 3805,65		 
 
The value of the firm is then the present value of the expected free cash flows to the firm 
and the present value of the terminal value: 
PV of FCFF (1-5) = 1.934,92 million 
PV of Terminal Value= 3.805,65 million 
  
Value of Firm= 5.740,57 million 
 
Enterprise value is defined as a sum of equity value and net debt, where net debt is the 
difference between debt and equivalents and cash. Cash and short term investments are 
equal to 1.007,1 million and total debt is equal to 1.013 million. Thus, net debt is 5, 9 
million. 
By subtracting net debt from the value of the firm we get the value of equity, which in 
Paramount’s case is $5.734, 57 million.  
Equity Value (million) $5.734,67 
Number of shares (million) $120 
Equity per share  $47,79 
 
From the valuation that was made it becomes clear that Paramount’s value of the equity 
per share is equal to $47, 79.  
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9. Value of Paramount to Viacom  
 
The amount of money paid for a target company should be equal to the target’s market 
capitalization before the bid and the premium paid in the takeover. The market 
capitalization before the bid is usually seen as the stand-alone market price of the target. 
Thus, from the bidder’s point of view, the acquisition is a positive-NPV investment only 
when the premium the company pays is not higher than the synergy created. Even though 
the premium that is paid is a specified number, the synergy is not- shareholders may be 
skeptical of the bidder’s estimate of their great size. The acquirer’s stock price response to 
the announcement of the takeover is a very helpful way to determine shareholder’s 
assessments of whether the acquirer under- or overpaid for the target company. In chapter 
7, I have shown Viacom’s shareholders opinion about the acquisition with Paramount. It 
became clear that from the investor’s point of view, the synergy created did not exceed the 
premium that Viacom was willing to pay for Paramount63.   
 
To value the hard synergy for the combined Paramount-Viacom company I will have to 
make new assumptions. Due to changed unlevered and re-levered beta, the WACC for the 
company is equal to 10, 52%. The following table shows the estimated EBITDA synergies 
from the merger: Paramount-Viacom: 
 
Table 14: Est. EBITDA synergies w/Paramount  for the years: 1994-1998 
 
 
The present value of the synergy for the period: 1994-1998 is $650, 73 million. If I assume 
that the merged company’s growth rate is 5% (the same growth rate was assumed for the 
companies, when they were operating separately), then the present value of all synergies is 
equal to: $3223, 20 million. The following table presents the synergy calculation, which 
was to be created by merging with Viacom. 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Estimated EBITDA synergies: 
Paramount -Viacom merger 134 150 171 216 223 
Discount rate (1+WACC)^t 121,25 122,80 126,67 144,77 135,24 
= $ 650,73 million  
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Table 15: Synergy calculation with the growth rate=5% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The synergy per share is $26, 86. To calculate the total value of Paramount share to 
Viacom I had to add the synergy per share ($26,86) and the price of the equity per share 
($47,79). This sum is equal to $74,65 and it means that Paramount’s stock is worth to 
Viacom at least $74,65. I get this price with the assumption that the growth rate does not 
change.  
However, this estimation of synergy seems to be too high. Paramount’s EBITDA in 1998 
was to be $910,10 million and Viacom’s estimated EBITDA synergies with Paramount 
was to be $223,00 million, which is 25%. This number is not highly probable and real. 
Even the fact that the above synergy calculation seems to be overrated I would like to see, 
what would happen if the merger created much faster growth too. The table below shows 
the calculation of the synergy with the assumption that the combined company has a 
growth rate at 6%.  
 
Table 16: Synergy calculation with the growth rate=6% 
Growth rate  6% 
Synergies year 6 $    236,38 
Terminal value of 
synergies in year 5 $ 5 229,65 
Present value of terminal 
value of synergies $ 3 171,52 
Present value of all 
synergies $ 6 993, 77 
Synergy per share  $ 58,28  
 
When comparing both of the above tables, we can observe a huge increase in the synergy 
made by the increased growth rate. The increased growth rate from 5% to 6% made the 
synergy worth $58, 28 per share. Of course this situation is even less probable than the 
Growth rate  5% 
Synergies year 6 $ 234, 15 
Terminal value of 
synergies in year 5 $ 4.241, 85 
Present value of terminal 
value of synergies  $ 2.572, 47 
Present value of all 
synergies $ 3.223, 20 
Synergy per share  $ 26, 86 
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previous. According to this calculation Paramount’s stock would be worth to Viacom at 
least $106, 07, which is way too much.   
According to the first calculation Paramount was worth to Viacom at least $74, 65. This 
price seemed to be too high. But the second valuation is even less realistic and the 
assumption that the merged company would be growing at 6% is too optimistic.  
 
10. Value of Paramount to QVC 
 
As it was concluded in chapter 5, Paramount and QVC did not have much overlap to cut 
costs. Hard synergy, which could occur from the combination Paramount-QVC, was much 
smaller than from the combination Paramount-Viacom. Merger Paramount-QVC was 
supposed to bring soft synergy, especially managerial improvement.  
Hard synergy from the merger Paramount-QVC will be calculated by taking the half of the 
estimated EBITDA synergies from merger Viacom-Paramount. It is probably very 
optimistic assumption, because there was not much overlap to cut costs from Paramount-
QVC combination. The following table shows the estimated discounted synergies at 
WACC (10,11%).  
 
Table 17: Est. EBITDA synergies w/Paramount  for the years: 1994-1998 
 
Present value of the synergy for the period: 1994-1998 is $329, 12 million. The following 
table shows the valuation of the synergy per share, with the assumption that the merged 
company would be growing at 5%. 
 
Table 18: Synergy calculation with the growth rate=5% 
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Estimated EBITDA synergies: 
Paramount -QVC merger 67 75 85,5 108 111,5 
Discount rate (1+WACC)^t 60,85 61,86 64,05 73,47 68,89 
= $329,12 million  
Growth rate  5% 
Synergies year 6 $ 117,08 
Terminal value of 
synergies in year 5 $ 2.291,10 
Present value of terminal 
value of synergies  $ 1.415,50 
Present value of all $ 1.744,61 
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Hard synergy per share is worth $14, 54 and this is not surprising that it is less than in 
Viacom’s case. It was obvious from the beginning that the Paramount-Viacom merger 
creates more hard synergy than Paramount-QVC. Every additional one per cent of extra 
growth is worth $3-4 per share (synergy per share increases from $14, 54 to $17,41, due to 
change in growth rate from 5% to 6%). But in QVC’s case it is not about hard synergy-it is 
about Barry Diller and his managerial opportunities. Soft synergy is very difficult to value, 
and since one merger creates more hard synergy while the other creates more soft synergy 
it is not easy to say which merger would be more valuable. From the financial point of 
view it becomes clear that the merger with Viacom made more sense for Paramount, 
because of the hard synergy created. But from the strategic point of view it was more 
reasonable to merge with QVC. 
 
11. Comparison of the initial and final bids: determining the overpayment  
 
Right now, when I know what Paramount’s price was and how much it was worth to 
Viacom and QVC I should answer the question: how much should Viacom or QVC offer 
to pay for Paramount? And how should be the offer structured?   
Beaceuse Viacom started the negotiations with Paramount it was in the position, where it 
could bid either high or low. A “bear hug” is known in M&A as a high initial bid. It refears 
to the expresion of affection, which destroys all resistance. This strategy discourages 
potential competitors and forces the target’s Board of Directors to accept the bid. The 
biggest disadventage of the “bear hug” is that it “gives value to target shareholders that 
might have been retained by the bidder with a lower-priced opening bid.”64 This approach 
is applicable when the bidder is afraid of the other competitors or does not want to have a 
long takeover battle and is impatient.  
The second opportunity that Viacom had was to bid low. This approach has a benefit of 
saving the gains from the acquisition for the bidder. But the iggest disadventage of this 
strategy is that it attracts the competing bidders. It is highly probable that it invites also the 
traget company to reveal an internal restucturing. This strategy is longer than the “bear 
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hug” it makes bidder more risky. This approach makes sence, when the bidder is very 
confident that it can win the tekeover battle and if there is only few competitors.  
Summering the above infomration, Viacom, as the first bidder in the battle could not bid 
less than Paramount was worth.  It also had to offer a premium over the market price for 
the synergy that was to be created. If Redston, the CEO of Viacom, was impatient and had 
not time it would have offered more from the very beginning. But this not have happened 
and thus QVC came into the game with its hostile takeover.  
Viacom’s final bid included $107 per share in cash for 50.1% of Paramount’s shares and 
for the remaining 49, 9%: 
• “0.93065 shares of Viacom Class B Common Stock, 
• 0.93065 CVRs65, 
• 0.5 Viacom Three-Year Warrants 
• 0.3 Viacom Five-Year Warrants  
• and $17.50 in principal amount of Viacom Merger Debentures with an 8% coupon 
and 12 year maturity if the Blockbuster-Viacom merger was approved. If the 
merger was not approved, the debentures would be replaced with $17.50 face value 
of Viacom preferred stock with a 5% dividend yield” 3 
The following table compares the initial and final offer.  The value of Viacom’s final offer 
assumes that the Blockbuster merger takes place. In the Viacom’s offer the warrant values 
are based on volatilities of 35% and the CVR values are based on volatilities of 45%. 
Viacom’s final offer was valued to $83.32 if the merger with Blockbuster was approved, if 
it was not approved the offer was valued to $81.4966.  
 
Table 19: Viacom’s initial and final offer 
Viacom's initial offer, September 12, 1993 
$9.10 in cash $9.10 
0.1 shares of Viacom A $6.60 
0.9 shares of Viacom B $53.44 
Total  $69.14 
Viacom's final offer, February 3, 1994 
Security  Value Ratio Amount Per Share 
Cash 107 0.501 1 $53.61 
Subordinated Debt 0.96 0.499 17.5 $8.41 
CVR 8.33 0.499 0.931 $3.87 
                                                 
65 The Contingent Valuation Rights 
66 Lazard Freres presentation to Paramount Board in Paramount Communications 13E3, May 25, 1994 
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Warrant - 3 year 3.28 0.499 0.5 $0.82 
Warrant - 5 year 5.48 0.499 0.3 $0.82 
Common 34 0.499 0.931 $15.79 
Total $83.32 
Sources: Lazard Freres presentation to Paramount Board in Paramount Communications 13E3, May 25, 
1994. 
This table shows QVC’s initial and finaloffer: 
 
 
Table 20: QVC’s initial and final offer 
QVC's offer, September 20, 1993 
$30.00 in cash $30.00 
0.893 QVC shares $50.01 
Total  $80.01 
QVC's final offer: February 3, 1994 
Cash 104 0.501 1 $52.1 
Preferred 31.53 0.499 0.239 $3.76 
Warrant67 - 10 year 15.97 0.499 0.32 $2.55 
Common 45.875 0.499 1.236 $28.3 
Total  $86.71 
Sources: Lazard Freres presentation to Paramount Board in Paramount Communications 13E3, May 25, 
1994. 
 
The average Paramount’s price in September 1993 was $55,5. I my opinion Viacom should 
not offer less than $65 for Paramount. This price includes a 15% premium over the current 
price. Viacom’s initial offer was $69.14 while QVC’s offer was $80.01. Because of the 
fact, that QVC made a hostile takeover offer for Paramount, Viacom had to increase its 
initial offer several times to win the battle. Viacom’s finanal offer was  $ 83,32. It is almost 
$20 more comparing to the price it could have offered as an initial price. If Viacom’s offer 
was $65 per share, the whole deal would be worth: 
 
120 million * $65 = $7.800 million. 
 
Becaue of the fact, that the initial offer raised several times in the end Viacom’s offer was 
valued to $83,32 and the whole deal was worth: 
 
120 million * $83,32 =  $9.998,4 million  
 
                                                 
67
 QVC’s value of warrant is based on a volatility of 25% 
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The difference between these two numbers is the amount, by which Viacom has overpaid. 
In my opinion Viacom overpaid for Paramount by more than $2 billion.  
 
12. Conclusion 
 
When studying Paramount’s financial performance relative to its peers in the three years 
previous to the acquisition there was at first no real indicator of a need for a change. 
However, when studying Paramount’s and peers’ strategic development it became apparent 
that the company had to follow the moves that were made in the media & entertainment 
industry. Due to the fact, that Paramount was at that time the last studio, that was left 
without any strategic alliances, the acquisition with either QVC or Viacom made sense 
mainly from the strategic point of view. Especially when considering that QVC and 
Viacom were in reality the only realistic acquisition candidates.  
Turning to both candidates: QVC and Viacom, it was really difficult to say which merger 
was better for Paramount. QVC was offering lots of soft synergy; especially it was giving 
rise to new business opportunities and better management. From the other hand Viacom 
was offering incremental growth and economies of scale and scope. Actually, each 
company was offering something that Paramount was looking for and that was valuable.  
Finally, as previously shown, the actual transaction of acquiring Paramount by Viacom, 
was definitely not value enhancing for Viacom’s shareholders and according to my 
estimates Viacom overpaid for Paramount by more than $2 billion. Even if I consider all 
synergies that were to be created, I still think that Viacom could have bought Paramount 
for a more attractive price, if it had bit a little bit more in the beginning of the takeover 
battle. This strategy would have probably discouraged QVC an other potential competitors 
and would have forced Paramount’s Board of Directors to accept the bid.  
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Abstract- Deutsch 
 
Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht den Übernahmekampf um Paramount Communications 
zwischen Viacom und QVC. Es gibt eine detaillierte Analyse von der Übernahme, ihre 
strategischen und finanziellen Gründen sowie Auswirkungen. Heute gehört Viacom zu den 
weltweit führenden Medienkonzern. Das Unternehmen  hatte einen Umsatz in der Höhe 
von $9,34 Mrd. (2010), das Umsatzwachstum 1% und Return on Equity 18, 2%. 
Am 3. Februar 2011 während der Finanz-Mitteilung für das Jahr 2010, sagte Philippe 
Dauman – der Präsidenten und CEO des Unternehmens: 
 
“We're off to a great start in fiscal 2011. The creative momentum in our 
major networks is building as we judiciously invest in original 
programming. This puts Viacom in the pole position in the race to capitalize 
on new opportunities for monetizing television content through emerging 
media here and around the world. We're excited about the potential for 
expanding our international businesses, and we know that our film studio is 
poised for a great year.”68 
 
Meiner Meinung nach hat Viacom für Paramount von mehr als 2 Milliarden Dollar 
überbezahlt. Viacom war bereit, mehr als QVC zu zahlen und deshalb hat Viacom  den 
Kampf gewonnen. Auch wenn Sumner Redstone, der CEO von Viacom, besaß mehr als 
75% der Viacom Cash-Flows der Stimmrechte, überschritt der Preis der Hybris 1,5 
Milliarden Dollar. Obwohl Viacom um mehr als 2 Milliarden Dollar überbezahlt hat, unter 
dem Kommando von Redstone, hatte das Unternehmen die beste Filme aller Zeiten 
produziert:  "Saving Private Ryan", "Titanic", "Brave Heart" und "Forrest Gump“. 
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